Using a comprehensive database of hedge funds, we examine the role of managerial incentives, flexibility, and ability in the performance of and money flows in hedge funds. We find that hedge funds with greater managerial incentives (larger value of the delta of option-like incentive fee contract and presence of high-water mark provision) and higher degree of managerial flexibility (longer lockup, notice, and redemption periods) are associated with superior performance. We also find that hedge funds with better managerial incentives and greater managerial ability (superior past performance) receive greater money flows while funds with greater managerial flexibility experience lower flows.
there is relatively little research in case of hedge funds. 3 Further, the primary focus of the research on hedge funds has been to explain the time-series variation in their returns. There has been limited analysis of the cross-sectional determinants of hedge fund returns and money flows. 4 This paper contributes to the literature by addressing two research questions. How do the cross-sectional differences in managerial incentives and flexibility relate to the performance of hedge funds? How do managerial ability (captured through the fund's past performance), incentives, and flexibility relate to money flows in hedge funds? The answers to these questions are important as they shed light on the efficacy of the contractual arrangements in the hedge fund industry. The effects of contractual provisions have significant implications for investors and managers. For investors, they help improve the capital allocation process, while for managers they assist in increasing their enterprise value. Given the recent trend of hedge funds being made available to retail investors, these findings would also be of interest to regulators.
Although the unique contractual arrangements make our study on hedge funds interesting in its own right, it also has broad implications for a large body of corporate finance literature. This is because there exist interesting similarities between the role of managerial incentives, flexibility, and ability in hedge funds and that in corporate firms. For managerial incentives, similar to hedge fund investors paying performance-linked incentive fee to their managers, shareholders in corporate firms award their top executives stock options as part of their compensation. For managerial flexibility, analogous to hedge fund investors locking in their capital during the lockup period after which they are free to divest, shareholders in corporations grant their board of directors a fixed term in office after which they need to be re-elected. 5 Finally, for managerial ability, both hedge fund investors as well as shareholders use past performance as a proxy. Well-performing hedge fund managers are pursued by investors to accept more capital, while top executives delivering superior stock returns are head-hunted by other corporations. These similarities suggest that there may be lessons that shareholders in corporations and investors in hedge funds can learn from each other's experience.
Although the relation between managerial incentives and performance has been examined in the executive compensation literature, there are potential endogeneity problems. For example, top executives can influence the pay-setting process and can issue stocks and options before release of good news. 6 This compounds the problem of attributing performance to managerial incentives. In addition, if their stock options end up deep-out-of-the-money, the executives can lobby for resetting of the strike price of existing options or issuance of additional at-the-money options. 7 In contrast, after poor performance, hedge fund managers can neither reset the strike price of their option-like incentive fee, nor can they increase the percentage of incentive fee charged (equivalent to issuance of additional options). Therefore, hedge funds can serve as a unique laboratory to shed light on the relation between managerial incentives and performance.
Previous studies in the hedge fund literature have used percentage incentive fee, which remains constant through the life of a fund, as a measure of incentives. 8 We believe that incentive fee does not fully capture managerial incentives. This is because managers of two hedge funds 5 Some corporations have staggered boards where a fraction of the members retire periodically (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2004) . Some hedge funds also have similar arrangement for lockups. For example, in 1996, LTCM allowed an investor to withdraw one-third of their capital in years 2, 3, and 4, thereby avoiding dates when a large amount of investor capital can be withdrawn (Perold, 1999) . 6 See Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) for the former and Yermack (1997) for the latter. 7 See Brenner, Sundaram, and Yermack (2000) . 8 Ackermann et al. (1999, page 862 ) discuss in detail the issue of incentive fee remaining constant as well as rule out the possibility of hedge funds charging higher incentive fee subsequent to good performance.
charging the same incentive fee face very different incentives depending on their return history, capital flows and contractual features such as hurdle rate, high-water mark, etc. To overcome these limitations, we proxy managerial incentives by the "delta" of hedge fund manager's calloption-like incentive fee contract, along with hurdle rate and high-water mark provisions. 9 Delta represents the expected dollar increase in manager's compensation for a one percent increase in fund's net asset value. Unlike the incentive fee percentage, our delta measure changes with the returns earned by the fund, inflows and outflows of capital and the degree of moneyness of the option granted by the profit-sharing arrangement. 10 We believe that delta is a better measure of managerial incentives compared to the incentive fee percentage. It is also consistent with executive compensation literature, which uses delta from the portfolio of stocks and options held by top managers of corporations to capture managerial incentives.
Although our delta measure takes into account hurdle rate and high-water mark provisions, the very presence of these provisions may have a direct impact on performance. For example, Lambert and Larcker (2004) show that the optimal contract for managers is frequently one that involves out-of-the-money options. Since hurdle rate and high-water mark provisions effectively make the call option out-of-the-money, arguably such features should motivate the managers to deliver superior performance. 11 Therefore, we also include hurdle rate and highwater mark provisions as our other two proxies for managerial incentives. One expects funds with greater managerial incentives to perform better and to attract greater money flows. 9 With a hurdle rate provision, the manager does not get paid any incentive fee if the fund returns are below the specified hurdle rate, which is usually a cash return like LIBOR. With a high-water mark provision, the manager earns incentive fees only on new profits, i.e., after recovering past losses, if any. 10 Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) theoretically model the value of the option granted by performance-linked incentive fee. Our paper is the first to empirically quantify the delta and use it as a proxy for managerial incentives. The correlation between delta and incentive fee percentage in our sample is 0.18, which underscores this point. 11 Hurdle rate provision implies that the incentive fee is an out-of-the-money option at the beginning of the year. The same holds for high-water mark provision if the fund has incurred a loss in the previous year, or has earned a positive return but not sufficient enough to recover past losses.
Next, we proxy managerial flexibility by the extent of impediments to capital withdrawals, namely, lockup, notice, and redemption periods, specified in the contract. Arguably, higher impediments to withdrawals provide the manager with greater freedom to follow different investment strategies. Therefore, one expects funds with greater managerial flexibility to display better performance. Although investors prefer better performance, all else equal, in order to meet unanticipated liquidity needs, one expects hedge fund investors to place more money into funds with lower lockup, notice, and redemption periods.
Finally, we believe that a useful proxy for managerial ability would be the performance record (returns and persistence in returns) of a fund. Due to limited disclosure, hedge fund investors have restricted access to information on portfolio holdings. Furthermore, due to the dynamic nature of hedge fund trading strategies, periodic information on holdings may be of limited use. Therefore, investors may be forced to rely on past performance and persistence in performance to infer managerial ability. 12 In such a case, one would expect funds with better past performance to attract larger money flows.
Our paper contributes to the empirical literature on hedge funds by examining these implications using a comprehensive database created by the union of four large hedge fund databases: CISDM, HFR, MSCI, and TASS. Due to data availability constraints, prior studies have used at most two databases, which excludes about one-third to one-half of our sample (see the Venn diagram in Figure 1 ). The comprehensiveness of the sample makes our findings more representative of the hedge fund universe.
12 There is large literature on performance persistence in mutual funds and hedge funds, see for example, Lehmann and Modest (1987) , Grinblatt and Titman (1992) , Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993) , Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994) , Brown and Goetzmann (1995) , Malkiel (1995 ), Carhart (1997 , Elton, Gruber, and Blake (1996 ), Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999 ), Carpenter and Lynch (1999 , and Agarwal and Naik (2000).
Our investigation uncovers many results that are new to the hedge fund literature. First, it
shows that funds with better managerial incentives and greater managerial flexibility are associated with higher returns. Also, such funds are more likely to exhibit persistently good (above-median) returns and are less likely to exhibit persistently poor (below-median) returns.
Second, it documents that funds with better managerial incentives experience more money flows while funds with higher managerial flexibility, (i.e., greater impediments to withdrawals) attract less money flows. Finally, it shows that funds with better managerial ability attract higher money flows. Overall, these findings significantly improve our understanding of the determinants of performance and money flows in the hedge fund industry.
Our findings also contribute to several areas of finance. First, our finding of managerial incentives being positively related to performance has interesting implications for the corporate finance literature. As discussed before, our proxies of incentives do not suffer from potential endogeneity problems and thus provide a cleaner test of the relation between managerial incentives and performance.
Second, our finding regarding the effects of incentive-linked compensation has interesting implications for mutual fund industry. Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2003) study the performance of mutual funds charging symmetric fulcrum-type incentive fees. This design of incentive fee contract differs from that in hedge funds that have asymmetric call-option-like incentive fee contract. Our findings enable the comparison of the performance implications of offering symmetric versus asymmetric incentive fee contracts.
Third, our finding that funds with high-water mark provision have higher returns has interesting implications for executive compensation literature. Lambert and Larcker (2004) predict that the optimal contract for corporate managers is frequently one that involves out-of-the-money options. However, it is difficult to test their prediction in corporations since most firms (95% according to Murphy, 1999) award at-the-money options to their top executives.
Since imposition of hurdle rate and high-water mark results in grant of out-of-money options to hedge fund managers, our finding provides empirical support for Lambert and Larcker's (2004) prediction. It also suggests that more research is required concerning performance implications of granting out-of-the-money options to top executives.
Fourth, our finding that higher managerial flexibility is associated with better performance has interesting implications for the agency theoretic literature. Although agency theory predicts a negative relation between managerial latitude and performance, empirical evidence in the corporate finance literature have been mixed. 13 Arguably, self-serving incentives created by managerial latitude would be restrained in hedge funds since managers are coinvestors and face strong financial incentives. Thus, our finding suggests that it may be possible to counter the negative effects of managerial latitude through appropriate financial contractual arrangements.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the related literature and testable hypotheses. Section II describes the data and construction of variables. Section III investigates our hypotheses relating to the cross-sectional variation in fund returns while Section IV tests our hypotheses relating to persistence in fund returns. Section V investigates our hypotheses regarding investors' money flows into the fund. Section VI offers concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.
13 Several studies have examined the relation between managerial discretion and performance. Berger et al (1997) and Denis et al. (1997) find a negative relation, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) find no relation, while Kesner (1987) and Donaldson and Davis (1991) find a positive relation between managerial discretion and performance.
I. Related Literature and Hypotheses Development
Unlike most mutual funds, hedge fund managers are paid asymmetric performance-linked incentive fee, which forms a large part of their total compensation. Recent theoretical work by Das and Sundaram (2002) suggests that incentive fee should result in better performance, however, the empirical evidence on this is mixed at best. For example, Ackermann et al (1999), Liang (1999), and Caglayan and Edwards (2001) find that hedge funds charging higher incentive fees are associated with better performance. In contrast, Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999) find that higher-fee funds perform no better than lower-fee funds. One of the reasons for this mixed evidence could be that managers' expected dollar gains from increasing returns depend not only on percentage incentive fee but also on other features of the compensation contract (hurdle rate and high-water mark provisions), volatility of the strategy, assets under management, etc. We overcome these limitations by using delta, the dollar increase in the manager's wealth for an increase of one percent in the fund's NAV as our proxy for managerial incentives. From agency theoretic literature, we know that the larger the delta, the greater are the managerial incentives to deliver superior performance.
In the spirit of Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) , we explicitly recognize that the incentive-fee contract is a call option written by the investors on the assets under management, where the strike price is determined by the NAV at which different investors enter the fund, and the hurdle rate, and high-water mark provisions. We also recognize that capital flows coming into a fund at different points in time are associated with different NAVs, and therefore different strike prices. As a result, the incentive fee contract of the manager resembles a portfolio of call options where each option is related to the flow each year having its own strike price. We compute the delta of these individual options, and sum them up to obtain the overall delta of a fund at the end of each year. We find that funds charging the same incentive fee exhibit very different values of deltas both in a given a year as well as over time (the correlation between delta and incentive fees in our sample equals 0.18). This highlights the limitation of using percentage incentive fee as a proxy for managerial incentives.
Although delta takes into account hurdle rate and high-water mark provisions, the very presence of these provisions also may have an impact on performance. For example, Lambert and Larcker (2004) show that the optimal contract for managers is frequently one that involves out-of-the-money options. Since hurdle rate and high-water mark provisions effectively make the call option out-of-the-money, arguably such features should motivate the managers to deliver superior returns. This leads us to our first hypothesis. We also examine the effect of unique contractual arrangements on money flows into hedge funds. As discussed in Hypothesis 1, performance-based compensation along with the presence of hurdle rate and high-water mark provisions provide strong incentives to the manager to perform better. Arguably, investors take this into account when they allocate capital across different funds. This leads us to our next hypothesis. This leads us to our final hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5: All else equal, funds with higher managerial ability (superior performance)
should be associated with higher flows.
We test these five hypotheses in the rest of this paper.
II. Data and Variable Construction

A. Data Description
In this paper, we construct a comprehensive hedge fund database that is a union of four large databases, namely, CISDM, HFR, MSCI, and TASS. This database has net-of-fee returns, assets under management, and other fund characteristics such as hurdle rate and high-water mark provisions, lockup, notice, and redemption periods, incentive fees, management fees, inception date, and fund strategy. 14 This enables us to resolve occasional discrepancies among different databases as well as create a sample that is more representative of the hedge fund industry. Our sample period extends from January 1994 to December 2002. We focus on post-1994 period to mitigate potential survivorship bias as most of the databases start reporting information on 14 The database provides information on contractual features as of the last available date for which the fund's data is available. Following previous researchers, we assume that these contract features hold throughout the life of the fund. Discussions with industry experts suggest that this is a reasonable assumption as it is easier for a manager to start a new fund with different contract terms instead of going through the legal complications of changing existing contracts with numerous investors.
"defunct" funds only after 1994. 15 After merging the four databases, we find that there are 7535 hedge funds, out of which 3924 are live as of December 2002 while 3611 became defunct during our sample period. In Figure 1 , we report the overlap among the four databases with a Venn diagram. It highlights the fact that there are a large number of hedge funds that are unique to each of the four databases and thus, merging them helps in capturing a more representative sample of the hedge fund universe.
One of the challenges in dealing with multiple databases is that they adopt different nomenclature to identify fund strategies. Based on description provided by the database vendors, we classify funds into four broad strategies: Directional, Relative Value, Security Selection, and
Multi-Process Traders. This classification is motivated by Fung and Hsieh (1997) and Brown and Goetzmann (2003) studies which show that there are few distinct style factors in hedge fund returns. Appendix A describes the mapping between the data vendors' classification and our classification and reports the distribution of hedge funds across the four broad strategies.
B. Measures of Performance and Money Flows
We consider four performance measures: annual returns, winner, persistent winner, and persistent loser. (i) Returns i,t is the annual return of fund i in year t (ii) Winner i,t is an indicator variable that equals 1 if fund i has above-median annual returns in year t, and equals 0 otherwise.
(iii) Persistent Winner i,t is an indicator variable that equals 1 if fund i is a winner in years t and t-1, and equals 0 otherwise. (iv) Persistent Loser i,t is an indicator variable that equals 1 if fund i is
a loser in years t and t-1, and equals 0 otherwise.
Following Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998) , and Goetzmann et al.
( 2003), we compute annual flow as the scaled dollar flow into the fund. Returns is the return for fund i during year t. Table I reports the summary statistics of performance measures and money flows. The mean annual return is 11.1% (median is 8.9%). We find evidence of persistence in our sample.
27.6% of the funds exhibit persistently good returns, while 27.9% of the funds exhibit persistently poor returns. A chi-square test reveals that these are significantly different from the naïve expectation of 25%. We find that the mean flows (30%) are much higher than the median flows (0.8%) suggesting that some funds experienced significant inflows from investors during our sample period.
C. Proxies for Managerial Incentives
As described earlier, incentive fee contract endows the manager with a portfolio of call options, which provides incentives to deliver superior performance. We proxy these incentives by the delta of the portfolio of call options, which equals the expected dollar change in the manager's compensation for a one percent change in the fund's NAV. The delta of each of the call options depends on the current NAV ("spot" price), the threshold NAV that has to be reached before the manager can claim incentive fee ("exercise" price), and other fund characteristics such as the fund size, fund volatility etc. 16 We describe the detailed procedure of computing delta in Appendix B. From Panel A of Table I , we find that the mean (median) delta equals $220,000 ($38,000). 17 Further, in our sample, 62.0% of the funds have hurdle rate provisions while 80.1% of the funds have high-water mark provisions.
In Table I Panel B, we report the intertemporal variation in the extent of moneyness of funds. We observe that the average moneyness of all funds across our sample period varies from -8.9% in 1994 to -19.1% in 2002, overall average being -13.0%. We find that average moneyness for funds with only high-water mark (only hurdle rate) provision varies from -4.4%
(-7.8%) in 1994 to -13.2% (-1.4%) in 2002, overall average being -8.8% (-4.9%) In contrast, average moneyness for funds with both high-water mark and hurdle rate provisions varies from -15.9% in 1994 to -26.2% in 2002, overall average being -19.7%. In the presence of both these provisions, the greater extent of out-of-moneyness is to be expected, as returns have to be sufficient to satisfy both the provisions.
D. Proxies for Managerial Flexibility
Hedge funds impose several impediments (such as lockup, notice and redemption periods) to capital withdrawals by investors. We find that 19% of the funds impose a lockup period whereas all funds specify restriction periods. In Panel A of Table I , we report the summary statistics of lockup and restriction periods. For the funds that impose lockup, we find that the mean (median) lockup period is 0.8 (1.0) years. We also find the mean (median) restriction period is 0.3 (0.2) years.
Having described the salient features of our data, we now proceed with the tests of the five hypotheses. The results of Model 1 show that the slope coefficient on delta is positive (coeff. = 0.012) and significant (p = 0.002), implying that higher delta is associated with higher returns in the following year. To gauge the economic significance of this estimate, we compute the effect on returns for one-standard-deviation change in delta and find that it corresponds to an increase in returns by 7.2% (a change of 0.8% relative to a mean of 11.1%). We also find the slope coefficient on high-water mark dummy to be positive (coeff. = 0.026) and significant (p = 0.001).
III. Factors affecting annual returns
The coefficient estimate implies that funds with high-water mark provision earn 23.4% higher returns (a change of 2.6% relative to a mean of 11.1%). The coefficient on hurdle rate dummy is positive but not significant. These results on delta and high-water mark lend support to our
Hypothesis 1 that higher degree of incentive alignment is associated with higher returns. 20 Since imposition of hurdle rate and high-water mark results in grant of out-of-money options to hedge fund managers, our finding provides empirical support for Lambert and Larcker's (2004) prediction.
As discussed in the introduction, we believe that incentive fee does a poor job of capturing managerial incentives. This is because managers of two hedge funds charging the same incentive fee may face very different incentives depending on their return history, capital flows and contractual features such as hurdle rate, high-water mark, etc. To highlight this point, we include both delta and incentive fee in the regression in equation (2) and report the results in Appendix C. We find that delta continues to be positive and significant in all four specifications, match when most of the variation arises in the cross-section rather than in the time series. 20 For robustness, we re-estimate our regression using three dummy variables: only hurdle rate provision, only highwater mark provision, and both provisions. Thus, the excluded category is the funds that have neither provision. We find that only high-water mark provision dummy and both provisions dummy are significantly positive and that these coefficients are virtually the same. This finding is consistent with the findings in Table II and confirms that out of the two provisions, high-water mark provision is associated with higher returns.
while incentive fee does not come out significant in any of the specifications. In the light of these results, hereafter we exclude incentive fee from all our specifications.
We also find the coefficient on lockup period (coeff. = 0.031) to be significantly positive, while the coefficient on restriction period to be positive, though not significant. A one-standarddeviation increase in lockup period increases returns by 9% (a change of 1.0% relative to a mean of 11.1%). These findings highlight beneficial effects of managerial flexibility and lend support to Hypothesis 2, which predicts that greater managerial flexibility should be associated with superior performance. These findings are also consistent with the notion that with greater flexibility, the manager is able to invest in illiquid securities and potentially capture illiquidity risk premia.
21
In order to examine the possibility that managerial incentives and flexibility may have longer-term effects on performance, we re-estimate equation (2) using two-year return (instead of one-year return) as the dependent variable. Interestingly, in unreported results, we continue to find strong positive relation between managerial incentives (delta and high-water mark provision)
and two-year returns. In fact, we find stronger positive relation between managerial flexibility and two-year returns (now the slope coefficient on restriction period is also significantly positive). These findings, once again, lend strong support to Hypotheses 1 and 2.
We observe that the slope coefficient on size is negative and significant (coeff. = -0.012; p = 0.005) suggesting that there exist diseconomies of scale in the hedge fund industry. This finding is consistent with Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) , who find that both large funds and top performers experience outflows of capital. They interpret this as evidence of limits to 21 Aragon (2004), in a contemporaneous working paper, examines the effect of lockup periods on returns and documents the presence of illiquidity risk premium. Aragon also studies the determinants of lockup provision.
growth in hedge funds. In a contemporaneous working paper, Getmansky (2004) studies competition in hedge fund industry and also finds decreasing returns to scale.
To allow for the possibility that our hypothesized variables may be non-linearly related to future returns, we also adopt a logistic regression approach. The dependent variable here is WINNER, which equals 1 if a fund has above-median annual returns in that year, and equals 0 otherwise. Towards that end, we estimate the following logistic regression: 
We report the results from this regression in Model 3 of Table II with robust p-values corrected for auto-correlation reported in parentheses. As observed in Model 1, we find the coefficients on delta, high-water mark dummy, and lockup period to be positive and significant.
In addition, we find that the coefficient on restriction period is positive (coeff. = 0.299) and highly significant (p < 0.001). 22 These findings lend strong support to Hypotheses 1 and 2.
Since computation of delta includes past performance, one may interpret the results in Model 1 as evidence of persistence in performance rather than a positive relation between incentives and performance. To isolate the relation between incentives (delta) and performance, we include , 1 i t Return − in Model 2 as additional variable in our multivariate regression. 23 We find that the relation between incentives and future performance continues to remain the same.
Similarly, we include , 1 i t WINNER − in Model 4 as additional variable and find qualitatively 22 For robustness, we also define a fund as a winner if its returns fall in the top quartile of its peer group and find our results to be qualitatively similar. 23 Since hedge funds invest in relatively illiquid securities, it can potentially induce serial correlation in monthly returns (Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov, 2004 ). We believe this should not affect our analysis, as we use annual returns. Nevertheless, using lagged Returns in Model 2 does control for any such bias.
identical results with the exception of lockup period. Additionally, we find that the coefficient on lagged Winner is highly significant. Based on coefficient estimates, there is 11.3% higher probability that the fund will repeat as a Winner (the implied probability goes up from 48.4% to 53.9%). These findings are suggestive of persistence in performance, an issue that we explore in greater detail in the next section.
One may argue that including prior year's return as a control variable may not capture the entire history of returns used in the computation of delta. To shed light on this issue and to serve as a robustness check, we focus our attention on only the second year of existence for each fund.
For this sub-sample, including prior year's return does capture the entire return history.
Therefore, we re-estimate Models 2 and 4 of Table 2 for this sub-sample and report the results in Appendix D. We find that the slope coefficient on delta continues to be positive and significant confirming that higher managerial incentives are associated with better future performance.
In summary, the results from this section lend strong support to Hypotheses 1 and 2. In particular, we find that funds with better managerial incentives deliver higher returns and are more likely to be winners. We also find that funds with greater managerial flexibility generate higher returns and are more likely to be winners.
IV. Factors affecting persistence in returns
While on average there is some evidence of persistence in annual returns in our data (see Table I ), the unique contractual arrangements in the hedge fund industry could result in a subsample of funds that may display higher likelihood of persistence in returns. From an investor's perspective, identifying such funds would be helpful in allocating capital across funds. Towards that end, we estimate the following logistic regressions: 24 The coefficient on delta is positive and significant (coeff. = 0.083) in Model 1, implying that higher delta is associated with a higher probability of being a persistent winner. An increase of one-standard-deviation increase in delta (from the mean) increases the probability of being a persistent winner by 4.3%. The coefficient on high-water mark dummy is significantly positive (p < 0.001), while the coefficient on hurdle rate dummy is positive but not significant. Funds with a high-water mark provision have 23.0% higher probability of being a persistent winner. These results confirm the prediction of Hypothesis 1 that funds with greater managerial incentives are associated with higher likelihood of being a persistent winner.
The coefficients on both lockup period (coeff. = 0.256) and restriction period (coeff. = 0.342) are significantly positive (p < 0.001). These results are consistent with Hypothesis 2 that funds with greater managerial flexibility are associated with higher likelihood of being a persistent winner. A one-standard-deviation increase in the lockup period and restriction period increases the probability of a fund being a persistent winner by 6.2% and 7.8%. Model 2 of Table   III reports the results for logistic regressions of persistent loser as the dependent variable. We find similar results as with Model 1 but with one exception. The coefficient on delta is negative but not significant. As expected, the coefficients on high-water mark dummy, lockup period, and restriction period are significantly negative.
Overall, the findings in this section confirm that funds with higher delta, funds with highwater mark provisions, and funds with longer lockup and restriction periods are more likely to be persistent winners and less likely to be persistent losers. The results in this section, as in the previous section, lend strong support for our Hypotheses 1 and 2.
V. Factors affecting Investor Money flows
In this section, we test the hypotheses concerning the determinants of money flows into hedge funds. As discussed in Section I, we expect that funds with better managerial incentives (higher delta, funds with hurdle rate and high-water mark provisions), lower managerial flexibility (funds with lower lockup and restriction periods), and greater managerial ability (funds with better prior performance) are likely to attract higher flows in the future. 25 We therefore estimate the following regression:
25 At times a hedge fund may stop accepting new capital as a result of having grown to its desired size or lack of investment opportunities. This would affect the money flows into the fund in the year during which the fund is closed for new investment. Unfortunately, this information is not available on a time-series basis. We would, however, like to point out that presence of such funds in our sample are likely to lead to a bias against finding a positive relation between flows and past performance. This is confirmed by our finding the same result when we include only funds open for investment using the last year's data for which we have this information. Qrank − , will also be zero. Given the variable construction, the coefficient of a given quintile rank captures the incremental slope with respect to the previous performance quintile.
We report the results of regression in equation (6) in Table IV under Model 1. Since investors may consider a longer-term performance as a measure of ability rather than a one-year performance, in Model 2, we form ranks based on 2-year returns ending in year t-1 as compared to 1-year returns in Model 1. Furthermore, since investors may be paying attention to persistence in performance as well, in Model 3, we replace fractional rank variables with persistence variables defined in Section II.
Across all three specifications, we find that funds with higher delta attract higher flows.
This relation is statistically highly significant in all three models (p < 0.001). Economic significance is also high. Depending on the regression specification, a one-standard-deviation increase in delta results in 26.6% to 28.3% higher flows (a change of 8.0% to 8.5% compared to the mean flows of 30%). Funds with high-water mark provision also attract from 20.3% to 29.7% higher flows (an increase of 6.2% to 8.9% compared to the mean flows of 30%). These results suggest that investors understand the performance implications of the compensation contracts awarded to managers and invest more in funds where there exist better managerial incentives.
26
These results strongly support Hypothesis 3.
Once again it is important to point out that since delta depends on past performance (along with some of our control variables), one may be led to believe that the positive relation between flows and managerial incentives (i.e., delta) may be arising from flows chasing recent performance. This is not the case in our regression as we have already included past performance as an explanatory variable in our multivariate regression. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, we re-estimate Model 1 (Models 2 and 3) using only the second (third) year of a fund's existence and report the results in Appendix E. We find that the slope coefficient on delta continues to be positive and significant in each of the three models. This further confirms that even when we explicitly control for the entire history of prior performance, money flows continue to exhibit strong positive relation with managerial incentives. These results once again strongly support Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 4 suggests that funds with longer lockup and restriction periods should attract lower flows. Across all three models, the slope coefficients on lockup period are negative (though not significant) while those on restriction period are negative and significant. In terms of economic significance, a one-standard-deviation decrease in restriction period is associated with 8.7% to 10.3% higher flows (an increase of 2.6% to 3.1% compared to mean of 30%). Overall, this finding lends support to Hypothesis 4 and suggests that, all else equal, investors prefer funds with lower impediments to capital withdrawal.
Hypothesis 5 suggests that investors would direct more flows into funds that have higher managerial ability, i.e., higher prior performance. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the coefficients on the top quintile, the third quintile, and the fourth quintile are significantly positive. 27 The coefficient estimate of 1.041 on the top quintile in Model 1 implies that the funds in this quintile attract 1.04 percentage points more flows (than those for the funds at the 80 th percentile) for every 1-percentile improvement in performance. Thus the best performer would receive 20.8% higher flows than the 80 th percentile performer. 28 These results strongly support
Hypothesis 5.
Our result that money flows chase returns is consistent with the findings of various studies conducted with mutual funds (Ippolito, 1992; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Goetzmann and Peles, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Sigurdsson 2004 ) and pension funds (Del Guercio and Tkac, 2002) . It is also consistent with the results obtained in a contemporaneous working paper of Getmansky (2004) , who shows that flows chase recent returns in hedge funds. However, it 27 As in Sirri and Tufano (1998) , we investigate the possibility that investors might consider coarser performance groups by combining the middle three quintiles into one group. The results (not reported for brevity) show that the coefficient of the top quintile (coeff. = 0.851) and the coefficient of the middle three quintiles pooled together (coeff. = 0.739) are significantly positive while that on the bottom quintile is indistinguishable from zero. 28 On a univariate basis, we find that the average inflow into funds in the top (first) quintile is 63% compared to an average outflow of 3% for funds in the bottom (fifth) quintile.
differs from the results of Goetzmann et al. (2003) , who also study hedge fund flows. We believe there are two main reasons for the difference in the findings. First, we use merged data on both onshore and offshore funds during 1994-2002 while they use offshore funds data during 1989-1995. Second, unlike their univariate analysis, we also control for several fund-level characteristics. We believe that the differences in the market environments during the periods covered in the two studies are mainly responsible for the differences in the findings. 29 To examine if this indeed is the case, we select offshore funds from our sample during 1989 to 1995 period, and estimate various specifications in Goetzmann et al. (2003) . Instead of finding a negative and significant coefficient for the top quintile like them, we find it to be negative, but indistinguishable from zero (see Appendix F). This suggests that characteristics of the hedge fund industry seem to have changed over time.
As mentioned earlier, investors may judge managerial ability by looking at the persistence in performance. Therefore, in Model 3, we replace the quintile ranks with persistence indicator variables. 30 We find that persistent winners attract 16.9% higher flows than those that exhibit reversals, while funds that are persistent losers have 19.1% lower flows than those that exhibit reversals. These are both statistically and economically significant results. The findings confirm Hypothesis 5 that well-performing funds attract significantly higher flows compared to poorly performing ones. 31 Interestingly, we also find that the coefficient on past flows is 29 For example, during our sample period data on hedge funds as well as a range of hedge fund indexes started becoming widely available. This made it easier for investors to obtain information about hedge funds and to compare their performance with their peer group. The restriction on the maximum number of qualified investors was also relaxed during our sample period thereby making hedge funds accessible to more number of investors. 30 Since in the regression we use indicator variables for Persistent Winners and Persistent Losers, the slope coefficients on these are relative to that on the funds that show reversals (i.e., funds that are winner in one year and loser in the other). 31 In order to examine if persistence matters over and above last year's returns, we include last year's returns along with persistence dummies in equation (6). The coefficients on Persistent Winner and Persistent Loser dummies continue to be significant as well as the last year's return continues to be significant, confirming that investors care about persistence in addition to the last year's returns.
significantly positive in all three models. Past flows can be interpreted as a measure of the degree of investor confidence in the manager and may also capture non-performance related characteristics such as marketing efforts of the fund.
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In summary, our findings lend strong support to Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5. We find that investors direct more flows to funds with higher delta and funds with high-water mark provision.
Investors dislike impediments to capital withdrawals and hence penalize funds with higher restriction periods through lower flows. Investors infer managerial ability from prior performance and invest more capital into funds that perform well in the past. Finally, investors seem to direct more flows into funds that are persistent winners and less flows into funds that are persistent losers.
V. Concluding Remarks
Hedge funds have several unique contractual arrangements compared to mutual funds.
They charge performance-based incentive fees and erect barriers to capital withdrawals by investors that give more freedom to managers in portfolio management. We assemble the most comprehensive database of hedge funds to examine the effect of these contractual arrangements on annual returns, persistence in returns, and investor flows into hedge funds. We document several new and interesting findings.
First, consistent with agency theory, we find that funds with better managerial incentives generate higher returns, are more likely to be persistent winners, and are less likely to be persistent losers. Investors seem to recognize the benefits of managerial incentives as we find 32 In the current specification, we do not include final year data on liquidated funds. Following Goetzmann and Peles (1997) , we assign a flow of -100 percent in the last year for funds that disappear due to liquidation. All of our results remain unchanged when we include the final year for liquidated funds.
that funds with better managerial incentives are rewarded with higher money flows. Second, we find that funds with greater managerial flexibility (longer lockups and restriction periods) generate higher returns, are more likely to be persistent winners, and are less likely to be persistent losers. Investors, however, seem to dislike restrictions such as lockups and restriction periods since they cannot liquidate their investment as and when they need the money.
Consistent with this explanation, we find that money flows are lower for funds with greater managerial flexibility. Third, we find that investors direct more money into funds with higher managerial ability as proxied by prior performance. Overall, our results have important implications for managerial performance and investor behavior in the hedge fund industry.
For future research, it would be interesting to investigate the implications of option-like incentive-fee-contracts for the risk-taking behavior of hedge fund managers. 33 Also, it would be interesting to examine the determinants of these organizational features by themselves and relate them to fund characteristics. The findings from such investigations would significantly enhance our understanding the extent to which solutions to the agency problems are successful in alleviating the problems in practice.
*** *** *** Zhou, Xianming, 2001, "Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance: comment," Journal of Financial Economics, 62, 559-571.
Table I: Cross-Sectional Fund Characteristics
Panel A of the table shows the summary statistics of various fund characteristics. Returns are the annual fund returns net of all fees. Persistent Winner is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the fund has above-median returns in two consecutive years, and equals 0 otherwise. Persistent Loser is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the fund has below-median returns in two consecutive years, and equals 0 otherwise. Flow is the investors' dollar flow scaled by assets. Delta is the expected dollar change in manager's wealth for a 1% change in NAV. Hurdle Rate is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the fund has hurdle rate provision, and equals 0 otherwise. High-Water Mark is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the fund has high-water mark provision, and equals 0 otherwise. Lockup period is the minimum time that an investor has to wait (after making his investment) before he can withdraw his money. Restriction Period is given by the sum of the Notice Period and the Redemption Period, where Notice period is the duration of the time the investor has to give notice to the fund about his intention to withdraw money from the fund, and Redemption Period is the time that the fund takes to return the money after the notice period is over. AUM is the assets under management. Volatility is standard deviation of monthly returns estimated over the calendar year. Hurdle rate, high-water mark, lockup period, restriction period, management fee, and incentive fee are timeinvariant. The summary statistic for lockup is based on the sub-sample of funds that impose lockups. Moneyness is defined as spot price minus the exercise price divided by the spot price. Panel B reports average moneyness at the beginning of 1994, 1998, 2002 and overall average moneyness through our sample period. Directional Traders usually bet on the direction of market prices of currencies, commodities, equities, and bonds in the futures and cash markets. 24% of the funds in our sample fall in this category.
Relative Value strategies take positions on spread relationships between prices of financial assets or commodities and aim to minimize market exposure. 23% of the funds in our sample fall in this category.
Security Selection managers take long and short positions in undervalued and overvalued securities respectively and reduce the systematic market risks in the process. Usually, they take positions in equity markets. 42% of the funds in our sample fall in this category.
Multi-Process strategy involves multiple strategies employed by the funds usually involving investments in opportunities created by significant transactional events, such as spin-offs, mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcy reorganizations, recapitalizations and share buybacks. For example, the portfolio of some Event-Driven managers may shift in majority weighting between Merger Arbitrage and Distressed Securities, while others may take a broader scope. 11% of the funds in our sample fall in this category.
Note: We exclude managed futures, natural resources, mutual funds, and 'other' hedge funds since these categories are not usually considered as "typical" hedge funds. We also exclude long-only funds, Regulation D funds, and funds with missing strategy information.
The 1 st investor enters the fund at the end of year 0, the 2 nd investor enters the fund at the end of year 1, the 3 rd investor enters the fund at the end of year 2, and so on….
For the fund's first full year of existence, since there is only one investor (assumption 1), gross returns can be computed as follows: 
where hurdle t = libor t if the fund has hurdle rate provision, and = 0 otherwise.
From the second year onwards, the computation of gross returns becomes more involved. Since investor money flow is assumed to occur at the end of the year, the reported net return is the year-end market value of year-beginning AUM after incentive fees has been paid to the AUM divided by the year-beginning AUM. For example, for a given investor 'i', the yearend market value of his assets net of incentive fees, MVafterINC, is given by
MVafterINC S ( 1 gross )-Max[( S ( 1 gross )-X ),0 ] I
where S i denotes market value of assets of investor 'i' ("spot price" as of year-end 't-1'), X i denotes the market value of assets of investor 'i' that has to be reached ("exercise price" as of year-end 't-1') before incentive fees could be paid out in year 't', and I is the incentive fee rate. The numerator in the net return formula is then the summation of the above over all investors ( i MVafterInc ∑ ) plus the year-end market value of manager's year-beginning investment in the fund. Since this is a non-linear function of gross returns, a closed-form solution for gross returns is not possible. Therefore, we solve this recursive problem iteratively to back out gross returns from the data.
2) Estimate the market value of manager's investment in the fund (MVmgr). This equals the year-end market value of his year-beginning investment plus the post-tax incentive fees earned in that year.
3) Estimate new money flow into or out of the fund as the difference between the reported yearend AUM less (
4) If there is net outflow, then the MVafterINC of the earliest investor is reduced by the outflow computed in step 3. If the outflow is greater than MVafterINC of the earliest investor, then the remaining balance is assumed to be withdrawn from the second earliest investor and so on… 5) Compute the year-end market value of assets for each investor (spot price S) and the fund manager 6) Compute the exercise price for each investor (exercise price X) depending on whether the fund has a hurdle rate and/or high-water mark provision a) If the gross return of the fund is high-enough such that an investor has to pay incentive fee, then the exercise price is higher than the current market value by the hurdle rate (=LIBOR if the fund has hurdle rate provision, and = 0 if the fund does not have the hurdle rate provision) b) If the gross fund return is not sufficient enough that an investor has to pay incentive fee and if the fund has high-water mark provision, the new exercise price is higher than the last year's exercise price by the hurdle rate c) If the gross fund return is not sufficient enough that an investor has to pay incentive fee and if the fund does not have the high-water mark provision, then the exercise price is higher than the current market value by the hurdle rate 7) Using the S and X of various investors' capital in the fund, compute the delta of each and sum them up along with the delta from manager's investment in the fund to estimate the total delta of the fund.
8) The total delta of the fund equals delta from investors' assets plus the delta from manager's stake. Since manager retains all the return on his own investment, delta from managers' stake equals market value of manager's investment in the fund * 0.01 (i.e., when fund earns one percent return, value of the manager's stake goes up by one percent).
Appendix C: OLS Regressions of Returns and Logistic Regressions of Winner using both Delta and Incentive Fee
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